Strength through Conviction

Peter Beinhart has an interesting piece in this weekend's New York Times magazine. The title, 'Rehabilitation of the Cold-War Liberal,' is somewhat misleading (the article barely touches on the Cold War liberal in question, Reinhold Neibuhr), but the content is provocative and challenging on a couple of fronts. My friend Paul Musgrave is too caught up in New York cynicism to see the truth in Beinhart's arguments, but I'll let it go this time without imposing Calvinball-related penalties on him.

Beinhart seems to have two points that are most worth pondering. First, he dares to argue that liberal foreign policy ought to draw strength from its convictions. This is no small contention these days. A sizable chunk of liberal elites is thrilled that simply embracing realistic self-interest can make liberals come off like trust-worthy world stewards in comparison with the ideological wrecklessness of King George. But is this enough? Beinhart argues convincingly that it is not only inadequate to the world we face, but a betrayal of the greatest achievements of liberals in foreign policy in the early days of the Cold War. Neibuhr had a deeply calculating, pragmatic streak, but it was grounded in principles far more meaningful than simple 'realistic' self-interest.

Which brings us to his second argument, equally contentious although quite different. What should these neo-liberal principles look like? Beinhart pushes his Cold War analogy in ways that aren't entirely satisfying, but are certainly provocative. In short, Cold War liberals were wise enough to realize that the foreign policy of a democracy must allow for difference in the world if that policy actually believes in its democratic ideals. Thus, the analogue to the socialist allies of Europe (which never fully yielded to communism) is today's popularly supported Islamist parties throughout the Middle East.

The challenge then becomes to determine WHY those European socialists never yielded to the USSR, and replicate those circumstances with contemporary Islamist parties. I'm no Cold War expert, but I'd posit that two features that helped America's cause in Europe do in fact exist today in the world of Islamist politics. First, ethno-nationalism never died in Western Europe. Nations wished to maintain national distinctiveness in a way that prevented submission to the heavy-handed USSR. A similarly enduring national strength remains in the Middle East. Pan-Arabism remains discredited, which ought to limit the threat that Islamist parties will unite in any meaningful way to control the region by force.

Second, I would imagine that US policy-makers indulged the socialistic experiments of Western European leaders, while establishing bright lines that could not be crossed without consequence. Why couldn't such an arrangement allow for engagement of Islamist parties? The United States will tolerate a great deal of internal diversity and autonomy within Islamic democracies, so long as nations eschew things like overtly calling for Israel's destruction, denying basic human rights (especially to women), and fostering terror groups intent on attacking the US.

This list of bright lines is clearly incomplete, but I think it is a viable path for engaging the very real and growing strength of political Islam. It would push liberals beyond short-sighted realistic calculation, indicate to the world that America can balance self-interest with local democracy, and remind us of some of the ideals that gave real strength to liberal foreign policy in the not-so-distant past.