Hamas, Sinn Fein, and Avoiding Bad Comparisons

Time for the Grillmaster to put on his Comparative Ethnic Conflict hat once again. With diplomas now officially in hand, the crew of Midnight Marauders from Belfast can call ourselves Masters. Cheers to all. Kate, I assume that yours is still lost in the mail?

It's fitting that we got our parchments the week of a truly historic election in Palestine. There has been much ink spilled in the past few days in turn describing Hamas' victory as a disaster for the peace process and the Palestinian people, or as the triumph of democratic government and a chance for accountable negotiation. The Grillmaster won't add that that general debate, except to briefly say that their victory is obviously disheartening in some ways, but also offers a real opportunity to change the systematized stagnation that the peace process (if you can call it that) has seen over the past five years.

I want to talk a bit about the transitions that militant groups make to democratic parties, and develop a comparison between the current state of Hamas and that of Sinn Fein over the course of the last decade. I've heard it said by a few people (including the BBC's always worth reading Mark Davenport) that Hamas might today be at the kind of transitional stage that Sinn Fein experienced in the last 15 years. There may be some similarities, but responsible comparison of these ethnic conflicts has to acknowledge the differences that will stand in the way of a Sinn Fein-like moderation on the part of Hamas.

The development of Irish republicanism is a powerful example of how a highly organized, highly violent, highly ideological movement can transition its organization and ideology away from violence. That development isn't complete, but is well on its way. What were some key steps in that development, and how might one reproduce them in Palestine?

First, the IRA's core of volunteers had to be absolutely convinced that the political process could advance their cause more effectively than violence. In Palestine, this will require Israeli politicians to make it perfectly clear that IF Hamas transitions away from violence, Israel will be willing to deliver real political consequences. Such assurances will run into a history of mistrust even deeper than that in Northern Ireland.

Additionally, Sinn Fein realized that it HAD to moderate it's use of violence in order to secure broad electoral support within the Irish nationalist community. This is a key difference with the state of affairs in Palestine. Hamas has been delivered to majority status WITHOUT an explicit renunciation of violence. The Palestinian people have given at least implicit approval to Hamas' violence. No such majority support ever existed in Northern Ireland.

Sinn Fein faced pressure both from domestic political constituencies and from key Irish-American allies to moderate the IRA's violence. Funders and highly visible politicians in America made it clear that Gerry Adams would gain a level of public support if he could move the IRA leadership away from violence. American and European governments may be able to exert similar leverage through funding delivered to the now Hamas-controlled Palestinian Authority. It would be even more helpful if Arab voices would step forward and encourage Hamas to continued political maturation.

Finally, there is no doubt that a highly ambitious, courageous, and bold group of Sinn Fein leaders dragged Irish republicanism, sometimes kicking and screaming, away from its history of violence. Say what you will about Gerry Adams' flaws, his leadership has overall been a profound force of moderation within republicanism. With so many of Hamas' senior leaders killed by Israel in recent years, there's no doubt in my mind that it will be the character of the rising generation of Hamas leadership that will exert vast influence on its development as a political force.

All of these key factors in the moderation of Irish republicanism are either missing or yet to be determined in Palestine. This also leaves aside the special role of Islam within Hamas and the corruption of the Fatah movement. In a decade Hamas may indeed have given up violence in favor of a non-violent political strategy. But to quickly assume that Hamas will follow Sinn Fein's path is a perfect example of the WRONG way to do comparative ethnic conflict. Trust me, I'm a master of it...